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SECTION 1985(2) CLAUSE ONE AND ITS SCOPE
INTRODUCTION
Section 1985(2) clause one proscribes conspiracies by two or
more persons to deter by force, intimidation, or threat any party or
witness from attending or testifying in federal court and conspira-
cies to injure the party or witness for having attended or testified.'
The section was enacted in 1871 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act,2
which sought to control Klan violence in the post-Civil War South,
3
but it was never in fact used against the post-Civil War Klan 4 and lay
1 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1982). Section 1985(2) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by
force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the
United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter
pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or
witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or
testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any
grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his per-
son or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment
lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or
if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering,
obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course ofjustice in any
State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection
of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or
attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the
equal protection of the laws;
The language preceding the first semicolon is "clause one." See Kelly v. Foreman, 384
F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (suggesting such partition of § 1985(2)). Because
clause one does not speak in terms of equal protection of the laws, it protects specific
activities vital to the functioning of United States courts without requiring any allegation
or proof of invidious discrimination. See id. at 1355. The language after the semicolon is
"clause two" which proscribes conspiracies interfering with the administration ofjustice
in state courts. The next subsection provides the remedy: "[Tihe party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
2 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The official title of the act was "An Act
to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and for other purposes." The acts also have been referred to as the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 and the Force Act of 1871.
3 See infra notes 10-19 and accompanying text; see also D. CHALMERS, HOODED
AMERICANISM 10 (1965) ("[The Klan] threatened, exiled, flogged, mutilated, shot,
stabbed, and hanged."); A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 686 (1935) ("[The Klan] stopped at nothing in its determination to crush the
'scalawags' and the 'carpetbaggers', and to put the negro 'in his place.' ").
4 The Ku Klux Klan Act was enacted in 1871, a full year after the height of the Ku
Klux Klan movement. By 1869, the Klan had started to lose the support of some of its
educated members and those who were officers in the Civil War. The Imperial Wizard
ordered the dissolution of the Klan in 1869 because it had fallen into "low and violent
hands." D. CHALMERS, supra note 3, at 19. Those who remained in the Klan were dis-
banded by federal troops under direction of the President pursuant to authority granted
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dormant until 1974. 5 In 1971, the Supreme Court interpreted sec-
tion 1985(3) cf the Ku Klux Klan Act to reach conspiracies not in-
volving state action.6 The broad interpretation of a related section
to cover private conspiracies dramatically increased the number of
cases brought under section 1985(2) clause one as well.
Concerned that section 1985(3) was being applied to areas be-
yond those intended by the 1871 Congress, the Supreme Court sub-
sequently narrowed its scope.7 Because section 1985(2) clause one,
like section 1985(3), is broadly worded, it also applies literally to
many situations beyond those intended by the 1871 Congress.8
Lower courts have taken different approaches toward narrowing the
scope of section 1985(2) clause one.9 This Note asserts that the best
narrowing approach is to require the presence or threat of physical
force or other malevolent acts for a section 1985(2) clause one ac-
tion. To reach this conclusion, the Note examines the legislative
history of the Ku Klux Klan Act, the practical considerations of re-
cent judicial holdings, and the purposes of section 1985(2) clause
one.
I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN ACT
A. Ku Klux Klan Violence
In 1871, Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act to combat out-
rageous and violent behavior in the South by an organization known
as the Ku Klux Klan.10 During debate on the bill, Republican mem-
bers of Congress attributed whippings, murders, and other acts of
by the Ku Klux Klan Act. By 1872, the Klan was greatly subdued. See D. CHALMERS,
supra note 3, at 18-20; A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 3, at 689-70.
5 Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D. Tex. 1974), was the first case brought
under § 1985(2) clause one. The Supreme Court's narrow construction of other civil
rights statutes led to the dormancy of this section. In United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629, 641-42 (1882), for example, the Court declared the criminal counterpart to
§ 1985(3) unconstitutional.
6 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (§ 1985(3) does not require state
action but reaches private conspiracies); see infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
7 In United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983), the
Court held that § 1985(3) "provides no substantial rights itself" and thus requires the
independent illegality of the defendant's actions. 103 S. Ct. at 3358 (quoting Great Am.
Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979)). See infra notes 56-69
and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
9 See Kimble v. DJ. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
454 U.S. I 110 (1981) (physical presence in court required); Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d
377 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill,J., dissenting) (evidence of physical force, threats of violence
or similarly malevolent acts required); see infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
10 See A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 3, at 688 ("[The Ku Klux Klan Act's] purpose was
to subdue the disorder in the south and to protect the freedom from violence and
intimidation.").
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violence in the South to the Klan." 1 Although the Democrats denied
the extent and character of the lawlessness, 12 the Republicans in-
sisted that through intimidation and murder the Klan sought polit-
ical control in the South. 13 According to the Republicans, the Klan
controlled elections by murdering leading Republicans and by in-
timidating Republican supporters. 14 The Republicans contended
that through such Klan control, the Democrats would reestablish
themselves in the South and would overthrow the reconstruction
policy, including the recent amendments to the Constitution. 15
Emphasizing that none of the perpetrators of the many outra-
geous crimes had been convicted, 16 the Republicans charged that
state authorities were unable or unwilling to control Klan crimes 17
and that many Klan members escaped punishment through perjury
by witnesses and intimidation ofjurors.' 8 On March 23, 1871, Pres-
II See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 369, col. 3 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Monroe) ("[T]he plain fact remains that members of [the Klan], with its approval, by
means of murder, burning, and scourging, have established in many neighborhoods a
reign of terror."); id. at 320, col. 1 (statement of Rep. Stoughton) ("The evidence taken
before the Senate committee. . . establishes . . . [t]hat this organization has sought to
carry out its purposes by murders, whippings, intimidation, and violence against its op-
ponents."). Historians confirm the Republicans' charges of Klan violence and disorder
in the post-Civil War South. See D. CHALMERS, supra note 3, at 10-21; A. McLAUGHLIN,
supra note 3, at 685-89.
12 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 11, at 330, col. 1 (statement of Rep. Morgan) ("That
crimes are committed is true. . . .But the number and character of offenses are will-
fully exaggerated."); id. app. at 139, col. 3 (statement of Rep. Vaughan) ("And yet have
we passed through the oppressive years since 1865, and have had but few, if any, out-
rages of political significance. Mr. Speaker, my people are peaceable and quiet.").
13 See id. at 484, col. 2 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (Klan's purpose is "to get rid of
either the State governments or those who hold offices under them"); id. app. at 196,
col. 2 (statement of Rep. Snyder) ("object [of the Klan is] the defeat of Republicanism,
the overthrow of the whole system of reconstruction, and the ultimate possession of the
Government"); see also Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in the Light of its Oiginal
Purpose, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 402, 408-09 (1979).
14 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 11, at 654, col. 1 (statement of Sen. Osborn) (assas-
sination of Republicans led to election of Democrat in county having 800 person Repub-
lican majority; one elected Republican "resigned for fear of assassination should he
work for the Republicans in the Legislature"); see also Comment, supra note 13, at 408-
10.
15 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 11, app. at 201, col. 1 (statement of Rep. Snyder); id.
app. at 195, col. I (statement of Rep. Buckley) "[Kukluxism] originates in a fiendish
conspiracy to deprive the colored race of the ballot."). See also Comment, supra note 13,
at 411.
16 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 11, at 320, col. 1 (statement of Rep. Stoughton)
("That of all the offenders in this order, which has established a reign of terrorism and
bloodshed throughout the State not one has yet been convicted.").
17 See id. at 321, col. 3 (statement of Rep. Stoughton) ("The State authorities and
local courts are unable or unwilling to check the evil or punish the criminals."); id. at
653, col. 3 (statement of Sen. Osborn) ("The State courts, mainly under the influence of
this oath [of Klan members to perjure themselves to protect other members], are utterly
powerless ....").
18 See id. at 653, col. 3 (statement of Sen. Osborn) ("What can we do when such
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ident Grant asked Congress for legislation giving him additional au-
thority to control "[a] condition of affairs [that] .. .exists in some
of the States of the Union rendering life and property insecure, and
the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue danger-
ous." 19 Representative Shellabarger of Ohio introduced a bill in re-
sponse to the President's request. 20
B. Constitutional Concern About the Original Bill
Shellabarger's bill authorized the President to use the armed
forces to suppress insurrection and violence and to protect those
rights secured by the Act that the states were unwilling or unable to
protect.2' In addition, the President could suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and enforce the laws subject to the rules and articles
of war if the unlawful combinations became sufficiently powerful to
represent a violent threat to state authority. 22 The bill also pro-
vided a private cause of action for deprivation of constitutional
rights by any person under the color of state law. 23 Finally, the bill
provided for criminal penalties for conspiracies to commit any act
violating constitutional rights that would "under any law of the
United States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder,
manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, sub-
ornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal, [sic] process or
resistance of officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or
larceny." 24
Many representatives from both parties opposed the criminal
men are allowed to crowd each other forward upon juries and upon the witness-stand,
with no purpose or object but to swear to truth or falsehood, to condemn or to acquit as
may best advance the interests of their order?").
19 Id. at 236, col. 1.
20 Id. at 317.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. This section was later codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
24 Id. In its original form, § 2 of Representative Shellabarger's bill provided that:
if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band, con-
spire, or combine together to do any act in violation of the rights, privi-
leges, or immunities of any person, to which he is entitled under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, which, committed within a
place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
would, under any law of the United States then in force, constitute the
crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and bat-
tery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal, [sic]
process or resistance of officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or
larceny, and if one or more of the parties to said conspiracy or combina-
tion shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to or en-
gaged in said conspiracy or combination, whether principals or
accessories, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ... .
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provisions of the bill.2 5 Representative Arthur of Kentucky claimed
that the Act "absorbs the entire jurisdiction of the States over their
local and domestic affairs" by a "sweeping usurpation of universal
criminal jurisdiction in the States."' 26 The Act, he claimed, would
punish as a felony the lowest grade assault and battery.27 Further-
more, some representatives felt the Act was an invalid exercise of
congressional authority over private conspiracies. 28 Representative
Poland of Vermont argued that Congress could pass legislation to
punish "offenses against person and property" within the authority
of the state only if the state denied someone equal protection of the
laws or if the state were prevented from applying equal protection
of the laws. 29 Representative Shellabarger denied that the bill
reached ordinary crimes.30 Nonetheless, the bill was amended to
meet these constitutional concerns,3 ' the amended version provid-
ing for a private cause of action in addition to the criminal
sanctions.3 2
25 The Democrats uniformly opposed the bill claiming that it would transgress into
the sovereignty of the states. "[The bill] overrides the reserved powers of the States. It
reaches out and draws within the despotic circle of central power all the domestic, inter-
nal, and local institutions ... of the States." Id. at 365, col. 3 (statement of Rep. Ar-
thur). According to the Democrats, the loss of state sovereignty would contribute to the
end of "Southern civilization." See D. CHALMERS, supra note 3, at 19-21. Some Republi-
cans opposed the bill because they believed Congress lacked authority to pass it. These
Republicans neverthelesg believed that the federal government should intervene to
quell the disorder in the South. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 11, at 485, col. 2 (state-
ment of Rep. Cook) ("I do not believe ... that Congress has a right to punish an assault
and battery when committed by two or more persons within a State"); see also Comment,
supra note 13, at 414-17.
26 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 11, at 366, cols. 1 & 2.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., id. app. at 313, col. 2 (statement of Rep. Burchard) ("If [the bill] intends
and must be construed to give the Federal courts jurisdiction to punish combinations or
conspiracies to commit murder, mayhem, assault and battery within a State, I can find in
the Constitution no warrant for the exercise of such authority."); see also Comment, supra
note 13, at 412-16.
29 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 11, at 514, col. I (statement of Rep. Poland).
30 Id. at 382, col. 3 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
31 Id. at 477-78. It is unclear which power of Congress the representatives believed
would be exceeded without the amendment. Id. app. at 220-22 (statement of Sen. Thur-
man). Because the Act was designed to facilitate enforcement of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the representatives presumably were interpreting that law. But see Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-07 (1970) (upholding constitutionality of § 1985(3)
under thirteenth amendment and right of interstate travel grounds but failing to con-
sider fourteenth amendment grounds). The Supreme Court summarily upheld the con-
stitutionality of § 1985(2) clause one in Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983), stating
that "[n]either proponents nor opponents of the bill had any doubt that the Constitu-
tion gave Congress the power to prohibit intimidation of parties, witnesses, and jurors
in federal courts." Id. at 727.
32 There was no legislative debate indicating the private cause of action's precise
purpose.
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The private cause of action, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 33
proscribes conspiracies that interfere with the administration ofjus-
tice in federal3 4 and state courts,35 as well as those interfering with
private enjoyment of "equal protection of the laws" and "equal
privileges and immunities under the laws." 3 6 Specifically, a claim
arises under section 1985(2) clause one when two or more persons
conspire to deter by force, intimidation or threat, any party or wit-
ness from attending or testifying in federal court. A claim arises
under section 1985(3) when two or more persons conspire to de-
prive any person, or class of persons, of the equal protection of the
laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws. Any person
injured or deprived may bring an action against one or more of the




A. Supreme Court: Section 1985(3)
Even though Congress enacted section 1985(2) clause one in
1871, no claims were brought under this section until 1974.38 Few
claims were brought under section 1985(3) until the 1970s, but
these claims did reach the Supreme Court. Because of the common
legislative history and similar language of the sections, the courts
have looked to the Supreme Court interpretations of section
1985(3) for guidance when interpreting section 1985(2). The influ-
33 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982). In 1874, Congress ordered Secretary of State Fish to
prepare the revised statutes of the United States. Secretary Fish reorganized § 2 of the
Ku Klux Klan Act into its current three subsections, making minor grammatical changes;
substantive meaning of the Act remained unaltered. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. at
724 n.6.
34 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) clause one (1982). See supra note 1 for the text of the
section.
35 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) clause two (1982). See supra note 1.
36 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982). The section provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the consti-
tuted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws
Id. Section 1985 also proscribes conspiracies that interfere with the official duties of
federal officers, and conspiracies that interfere with the right to support candidates in
federal elections.
37 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
38 Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D. Tex. 1974), included the first citation
of § 1985(2) clause one.
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ence of section 1985(3) interpretation on subsequent interpretation
of section 1985(2), therefore, makes subsection three an appropri-
ate beginning point for analysis of subsection two.
In 1951, the Supreme Court interpreted section 1985(3) in Col-
lins v. Hardyman.39 Collins involved a nonracially motivated political
brawl between two groups of citizens. 40 The complaint alleged that
the defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to
assemble.4 ' The Supreme Court held, in effect, that section 1985(3)
reached only conspiracies under the color of state law and, there-
fore, did not cover the conspiracy in question.42
Twenty years later, in Griffin v. Breckenbridge,43 the Supreme
Court rejected the narrow construction of section 1985(3) an-
nounced in Collins and extended section 1985(3) to reach private
conspiracies. 44 In Griffin, the white defendants encountered the
plaintiffs, several black men, travelling on a public highway in Mis-
sissippi. They mistook one of the group for a civil rights worker,
stopped the car and clubbed the plaintiffs.45 The Court relied on
the text of the statute,46 companion provisions, 47 and legislative his-
tory48 to hold that section 1985(3) was meant to reach private
conspiracies.
The Court was reluctant, however, to extend the section to
39 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
40 Id. at 653-54, 662. The plaintiffs, members of a political club, scheduled a meet-
ing to adopt a resolution opposing the Marshall Plan. Wearing American Legion caps,
the defendants broke up the meeting.
41 Id. at 654. The plaintiffs alleged that this conduct violated § 1985(3). See supra
note 36 for the text of § 1985(3).
42 341 U.S. at 661-62. There was no action by any state officials and no claim that
defendants acted under color of state law. The Court stated that private discrimination
would not constitute inequality before the law unless that discrimination involved some
manipulation of the law or its agencies. The Court implied that only a private conspir-
acy of the magnitude and effect of the post-Civil War South Ku Klux Klan might consti-
tute such a manipulation. Because a private conspiracy of the Klan magnitude is
unlikely, the statute effectively required action under color of state law.
43 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
44 Id. at 95-96, 101.
45 Id. at 89-91.
46 Id. at 96-98. "On their face, the words of the statute fully encompass the conduct
of private persons .... [Slince the 'going in disguise' aspect must include private ac-
tion, it is hard to see how ... [the section] could be read to require the involvement of
state officers." Id. at 96.
47 Id. at 97-99. "The approach of this Court to other Reconstruction civil rights
statutes ... has been to 'accord [them] a sweep as broad as [their] language.' " Id. at 97
(citations omitted). A state action requirement would deprive § 1985(3) of all independ-
ent effect from 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 99.
48 Id. at 99-102. "The explanations [for the 'equal protection of the laws'] language
centered entirely on the animus or motivation that would be required, and there was no
suggestion whatever that liability would not be imposed for purely private conspiracies."
Id. at 100. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text for the legislative history reflect-
ing the addition of the above language to § 1985(3).
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cover all private conspiracies that interfere with the rights of
others. 49 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, avoided the "con-
stitutional shoals. . . of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal
tort law . . . by giving full effect to the congressional purpose-by
requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidi-
ously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the lim-
iting amendment."50 For a private conspiracy to be actionable
under section 1985(3), in the majority's view, the conspiracy must
be motivated by a racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory
animus.
The Griffin Court did not decide whether a conspiracy moti-
vated by invidiously discriminatory animus other than racial bias
would be actionable under section 1985(3). The lower courts, how-
ever, have extended section 1985(3) to cover many classes of bias in
addition to race.51 The Griffin extension of section 1985(3) to cover
private conspiracies and the extension by lower courts of the classes
protected by section 1985(3) resulted in a dramatic increase in the
number of cases brought under the section. 52
The Supreme Court subsequently narrowed section 1985(3).
First, in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny,5 3
the Court held that section 1985(3) itself confers no substantive
rights; it merely offers a remedy for violation of the rights it
designates. 54 The Court went on to hold that plaintiffs may not as-
sert title VII rights under section 1985(3) because to do so would
impair the effectiveness of title VII.55
49 Id. at 101.
50 Id. at 102.
51 See, e.g., Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 718-24 (5th Cir. 1981), af'd on rehearing,
680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v.
Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983) (nonunion employees); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Reichardt, 591 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1979) (sex); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d
899, 911-12 (6th Cir.) (advocates of political candidate), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975);
Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 389 F.2d 1057, 1064-65 (6th Cir. 1973) (members of religious
or nationality groups). See generally Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(c): A Suggested Approach, 64 MINN. L. REv. 635 (1980).
52 See Note, supra note 51, at 642-44, 646-52, 657-65 and cases cited therein.
53 442 U.S. 366 (1979). The association terminated Novotny after he expressed
support for equal employment opportunity. Novotny sought relief under § 1985(3),
claiming that he was injured and deprived of the equal protection of the laws by a con-
spiracy motivated by an invidious animus against women.
54 Id. at 372. The textual basis for the Court's holding was the "equal protection of
the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under the laws" language of § 1985(3).
55 Id. at 378. "If a violation of Title VII could be asserted through § 1985(3), a
complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific provisions of [title
VII]. . . . The plaintiff or defendant might demand a jury trial. The. . .time limita-
tions of Title VII would be grossly altered. . . . [T]he complainant could completely
bypass the administrative process .... " Id. at 375-76.
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In United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott,56 the
Supreme Court followed the Novotny holding that section 1985(3)
itself provides only a remedy for the violation of substantive rights
otherwise conferred. 57 In Scott, members of local unions drove onto
a contractor's construction site, beat the contractor's employees,
and destroyed construction equipment because the contractor hired
nonunion workers. 58 Plaintiff employees claimed the defendants
conspired to deprive them of their first amendment right to associ-
ate with their fellow nonunion employees. 59 The Court held that an
alleged conspiracy to infringe first amendment rights is not a viola-
tion of section 1985(3) unless the state is involved in the conspiracy
or the conspiracy's goal is to influence the activity of the state.60
From the premise that section 1985(3) is only remedial, the
Court concluded that the rights, privileges and immunities that sec-
tion 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere.6 1 In Scott, the
plaintiffs invoked their first amendment rights. Because state action
is required to violate the first amendment, state action 'is also neces-
sary for a first amendment claim under section 1985(3).62 Section
1985(3) thus requires independent illegality of the defendant's
actions. 63
Furthermore, in Scott the Supreme Court narrowed the classes
protected by section 1985(3). The lower courts had both held that
section 1985(3) reaches conspiracies against workers who refuse to
join a union.64 The Supreme Court held the section does not reach
these conspiracies and intimated that the section reaches only con-
spiracies motivated by racial bias.65 The Court first looked to the
legislative history supporting the protection of classes on account of
political views or activities, but flatly rejected the proposition "that
56 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983).
57 Id. at 3358.
58 Id. at 3355.
59 Id. at 3355-56.
60 Id. at 3356-57.
61 Id. at 3358.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 230 (E.D. Tex. 1978) ("Plaintiffs . . .are
members of a discernible class, to wit: non-union laborers and employers of non-union
laborers."), affd in part, 680 F.2d 979, 992-95 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. United Bhd.
of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983). The court of appeals stated,
[A]n animus directed against nonunion association is closely akin to ani-
mus directed against political association. . . . [The position of these
nonunion employees . . . is markedly similar to that of the Republicans
in the [1871] South. . . . [T]he same hostility toward nonunion employ-
ees classifies them as the kind of persons Congress intended the Ku Klux
Klan Act to protect.
680 F.2d at 994.
65 103 S. Ct. at 3360.
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the provision was intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias
towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activi-
ties." 66 Such a construction, the Court argued, would extend sec-
tion 1985(3) into the economic life of the country in a way not
intended by the 1871 Congress. 67 The Court suggested that such
"[e]conomic and commercial conflicts . ..are best dealt with by
statutes, federal or state, specifically addressed to such problems, as
well as by the general law proscribing injuries to persons and prop-
erty." 68 The Court noted that Congress could pass a new statute if
its interpretation misconstrued the intent of the 1871 Congress. 69
With the Scott decision, the Supreme Court has come almost full
circle in its interpretation of section 1985(3). The Court, in Collins,
required action under the color of state law.70 In Griffin, the Court
rejected the Collins interpretation and extended section 1985(3) to
reach private conspiracies motivated by class-based animus.71 In
Scott, the Court curbed the scope of section 1985(3) by requiring
independent illegality of the private conspiracy and by limiting the
types of classes that meet the class-based animus requirement.7 2
B. Supreme Court: Section 1985(2) Clause One
The Griffin opinion fueled a dramatic increase in the number of
section 1985(2) cases. The Supreme Court first interpreted section
1985(2) in Kush v. Rutledge.73 In Kush, the sole issue before the
Court was whether the section 1985(3) class-based animus require-
ment outlined in Griffin applied to section 1985(2) clause one. Rut-
ledge, a white football player, sued Arizona State University and its
officials for incidents that occurred while he was a member of the
college football squad. Rutledge claimed, in part, that Arizona
State's athletic director, head football coach, and assistant football
coach engaged in a conspiracy to intimidate and threaten various
potential witnesses in order to prevent them from testifying at Rut-
ledge's lawsuit in federal court.74 The district court dismissed the
suit on grounds that Rutledge failed to state a claim under section
1985(2) because he did not show that he was a member of an identi-
fiable class. 75 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that class-
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 3361.
69 Id.
70 See supra note 39-42 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
73 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983).
74 Id. at 1485.
75 Id. The district court opinion is not published.
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based animus was not required under section 1985(2) clause one. 76
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of statutory
construction. 77
In Kush, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend
to impose a requirement of class-based animus on persons seeking
to prove a violation of their rights under section 1985(2) clause
one. 78 The Court first looked to the statute's language. The statu-
tory provisions relating to the institutions and processes of the fed-
eral government did not contain any language requiring that the
conspirators act with intent to deprive their victims of the "equal
protection of the laws." 79 Instead, this "equal protection of the
laws" language was the textual basis for the class-based animus re-
quirement promulgated in Griffin.s0
The Court also found support for its holding in the legislative
history behind section 1985(3). The "equal protection" language
arose in response to objections that the "enormous sweep of the
original language" vastly extended federal authority and displaced
state control over private conduct.81 This legislative background,
the Court argued, did not apply to section 1985(2) clause one be-
cause there was no doubt that the Constitution gave Congress the
power to prohibit intimidation of parties, witnesses, and jurors in
federal courts.8 2 The Court concluded that "[p]rotection of the
processes of the federal courts was an essential component of Con-
gress' solution to disorder and anarchy in the southern States." 8 3
C. Lower Courts: Section 1985(2) Clause One
The Supreme Court in Kush answered only the narrow question
of whether a section 1985(2) clause one action requires a showing of
class-based animus. The Court did not otherwise discuss the scope
of section 1985(2) clause one. The lower courts have taken three
approaches in narrowing the scope of section 1985(2) clause one.
76 Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1981)
("[W]e are guided by the plain language of the first part of section 1985(2) and the
legislative history which indicates clearly that the constitutional concerns that led to re-
stricting the second [clause] of section 1985(2) [and § 1985(3)] to deprivations of equal
protection of the laws were not applicable to [the first clause of § 1985(2)]."), aft'd, 460
U.S. 719 (1983).
77 458 U.S. 1120 (1982).
78 Id. at 1485.
79 See supra note I for the text of the section. The provisions relating to the institu-
tions and processes of the federal government were § 1985(l), § 1985(2) clause 1, and
§ 1985(3) clause 2. 103 S. Ct. at 1487.
80 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. The "equal protection of the laws
language" relates to § 1985(2) clause 2 and § 1985(3) clause 1. 103 S. Ct. at 1487.
81 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
82 103 S. Ct. at 1488.
83 Id.
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First, the courts have required a connection between the proscribed
activities and a specific federal proceeding and a connection be-
tween the conspiratorial 84 conduct and the witness, party, or ju-
ror.85 Second, the Fifth Circuit in Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc.86 held
that the retaliation part of clause one requires actual physical pres-
ence in the courtroom. Finally, courts have held that the section
requires evidence of physical force, threats of violence or similarly
malevolent acts.87
The courts have required a nexus between the conspiracy and a
court proceeding.88 In In reJackson Lockdown/MCO Cases,89 the dis-
trict court dismissed the plaintiff's section 1985(2) claim for failing
"to allege a specific state or federal proceeding related to the alleged
conspiracy." 90 In Jackson, the plaintiff, an inmate in a stat6 peniten-
tiary, alleged a violation of section 1985(2) clause one arising from a
prison lockdown9 l and rioting following the lockdown.9 2 Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants' lockdown was "for
the purpose of punishing plaintiff and obstructing and hindering his
suing the state."9 3 The court held that the plaintiff failed to show a
84 Section 1985(2) clause one requires a conspiracy among two or more persons.
One issue arising under § 1985(2) clause one is whether a corporation may "conspire"
with its officers. Under the "entity approach" a corporation cannot conspire with its
agents because the corporation and its agents constitute a single person. Dombrowski v.
Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972). Therefore, there is no conspiracy under
§ 1985(2) if the challenged conduct is essentially a single act by a single corporation,
acting exclusively through its own directors, officers, and employees, each acting within
the scope of his employment. Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453-59 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978). An action alleging conspiracy among officials of a single
organization, however, is proper where numerous and varied acts of discrimination by
several persons within that organization are committed against the plaintiff and such acts
do not constitute a single corporate act. An-Ti Ghai v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 493 F.
Supp. 1137, 1166-67 (W.D. Mich. 1980). See also Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(c), 92 Hagv. L. REv. 470 (1978).
85 See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
86 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981). See infra
notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
87 See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[nio nexus whatso-
ever . . . between the alleged conspiracy and any federal proceeding"); Brawer v.
Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976) (allegation that federal prosecutor and wit-
ness conspired to use perjured testimony, conceal exculpatory evidence, and deprive
plaintiffs of fair trial constituted "influence [upon the jurors] . . . too remote to fit
within the intended ambit of § 1985(2)"). Section 1985(2) covers "conspiratorial con-
duct that directly affects or seeks to affect parties, witnesses or... jurors." Id. (emphasis
in original).
89 568 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1983). In Jackson, 22 complaints were filed, but for
purposes of the defendants' motions to dismiss, the court took one complaint "as the
paradigm of all of the [others]." Id. at 873.
90 Id. at 886 (emphasis in original).
91 A lockdown is an indefinite confinement of prisoners to their cells.
92 568 F. Supp. at 872.
93 Id. at 885 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
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nexus between the alleged conspiracy and a court proceeding.94
The plaintiff's allegations that he had " 'used both administrative
and judicial forums' and that in some of these actions 'the defend-
ants were parties or otherwise involved'. . . fail[ed] to state the req-
uisite nexus." 95  Likewise, if the connection between the
conspiratorial conduct and the parties or witnesses is too tenuous or
remote, the section 1985(2) clause one claim will be dismissed.96
The Fifth Circuit in Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc. focused on the
"attended or testified" requirement in the retaliation part of section
1985 (2) clause one. 97 The plaintiff sued D.J. McDuffy and other em-
ployers who belonged to the Industrial Foundation of the South,98
for conspiring to deny him and others employment because they
had filed personal injury suits or workers' compensation claims
against employers in the oil drilling industry. 99 The Industrial
Foundation of the South, a trade association, collects and distrib-
utes to member employers the names of those employees who have
filed work-related personal injury claims. 100 Shortly after joining
the trade association, DJ. McDuffy fired Kimble. 101 Kimble, unsuc-
cessful in obtaining new employment in the industry, filed suit alleg-
ing that he was fired and blacklisted because he had sued two former
employers for job related injuries. 10 2 Kimble charged that the em-
ployers had violated section 1985(2) by retaliating against him for
pursuing his rightful remedies.
The district court dismissed Kimble's section 1985(2) clause
one claim because the filing of lawsuits or workers' compensation
claims did not constitute attending or testifying in court as required
by the statute.103 The Fifth Circuit initially reversed, holding that
for purposes of section 1985(2) a person is deemed to have at-
tended court from the time a complaint is filed. 10 4 The court re-
jected the narrow reading of the phrase "attended or testified" that
required actual physical presence in a courtroom. According to the
Court, Congress enacted section 1985(2) clause one "in order to
94 Id. at 886.
95 Id. at 886 (quoting plaintiffs First Amended Complaint 18).
96 Id. at 886.
97 648 F.2d 340, 347-48 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981). See
supra note 1 for the text of the section.
98 The Industrial Foundation of the South is a nonprofit corporation organized to
assist members in hiring personnel. 648 F.2d at 342.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 342-43.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 343 nn.2 & 4.
103 Kimble V. DJ. McDuffy, 445 F. Supp. 269, 276 (E.D. La. 1978), affid, 648 F.2d
340 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981).
104 Kimble v. DJ. McDuffy, 623 F.2d 1060, 1068 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 648 F.2d
340 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981).
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protect the sanctity of federal court proceedings and prevent mis-
carriages of justice." 10 5 The court concluded that "Congress un-
doubtedly intended to protect the whole course of justice"
beginning with the moment a party files. 106
The Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc, vacated its earlier
opinion, and affirmed the district court's holding that the filing of
lawsuits or workers' compensation claims did not fulfill the statute's
attending or testifying requirement.10 7 The court supported its
conclusion by examining the plain meaning of the word "attend,"
which means "to be present at," and the legislative history of sec-
tion 1985(2).108 According to the court, passage of the Ku Klux
Klan Act was motivated by a desire to prevent and punish acts of
terror and intimidation in the post-Civil War South. The court con-
cluded that in light of the acts of violence that threatened the sanc-
tity of the federal courts, Congress intended section 1985(2) clause
one to protect those parties who were physically present to attend
or testify in a federal court.10 9 The court added that section 1985(2)
clause one was not intended to create a federal tort remedy for eco-
nomic retaliation against those who pursue work-related injury
claims.110
Other courts have used the "force, intimidation, or threat" lan-
guage of the statute to limit section 1985(2) clause one." 1 Justice
Meskill forcefully stated this position in his dissent in Keating v. Ca-
rey. 112 In that case Keating alleged that the defendants dismissed
him from his government job because of his affiliations with the Re-
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 648 F.2d at 342.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 348 ("[Section 1985(2) clause one] was intended to protect against direct
violations of a party or witness's right to attend or testify in federal court.").
110 Id.
111 See, e.g., Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 451 (7th Cir. 1980) (alleged
conspiracy among doctors to withhold services to any person who instituted malpractice
suit dismissed because no force, intimidation or threat shown); Brown v. Chaffee, 612
F.2d 497, 502 (10th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff claimed he was "'intimidated' from testifying
freely and fully because the content of his testimony was determined by his attorney's
questions," court found no cause of action because plaintiff was not deterred directly
from testifying); Toteffv. Village of Oxford, 562 F. Supp. 989, 998-99 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(no § 1985(2) claim because plaintiff's failure to attend not due to "force, intimidation
or threat" but to lack of notice). But see McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (allegation that own former attorney conspired to dissuade plaintiff from testify-
ing in his own behalf remanded on issue of intimidation because claim not "frivolous");
Hoopes v. Nacrelli, 512 F. Supp. 363, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (if city council's and mayor's
requests for information about pending federal investigation, threats of sanctions for
refusing to answer, and suggestions plaintiff was not performing his job as police chief
were intended to deter plaintiff from testifying at trial, then § 1985(2) violated).
112 706 F.2d 377, 392 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill,J., dissenting).
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publican party.' 13 He also claimed that the defendants, by threaten-
ing to trump up charges against him, conspired to deter him from
bringing suit in federal court to contest his termination.1 4 The ma-
jority remanded on the issue of "whether the defendants' conduct
constitutes the use of 'force, threat or intimidation' within the mean-
ing of the statute."' 1 5 In his dissent, however, Justice Meskill ar-
gued that the section 1985(2) cause of action should be dismissed
because "a veiled threat of political recrimination against a white
New York Republican in the 1970s [is not] sufficient to satisfy the
'force, intimidation or threat' component of section 1985(2)."116
Meskill concluded that a cause of action under section 1985(2)
clause one should "require evidence of physical force, threats of vio-
lence or similarly malevolent acts." ' 1 7 He asserted that "the limited
purpose and historical origin of this statute" justified this eviden-
tiary requirement. 1 8 According to Meskill, the statute's primary
purpose was to protect "those citizens who were being victimized by
brutal and senseless acts of violence during the Reconstruction
Era."" 9 A mere threat of political recrimination is qualitatively dif-
ferent from the acts of violence that Congress intended the statute
to reach. 120
III
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Section 1985(2) clause one lay dormant for over 100 years.
The Supreme Court's narrow construction of other civil rights stat-
utes probably led to this dormancy.' 2 1 In the 1960s, however, the
Supreme Court's attitude toward interpretation of the civil rights
statutes broadened significantly. The statutes were given a sweep as
113 Id. at 379.
114 Id. at 380.
115 Id. at 386 n. 13 ("We must leave it to the district court to decide what sorts of
threatening or coercive acts the plaintiff may prove and whether such acts are prohibited
by the statute, in light of its history and purpose.").
116 Id. at 392 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
117 Id.
118 Id. Meskill cited DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir.
1979), which states: "[W]e may not uproot § 1985(3) from the principle underlying its
adoption: the Governmental determination that some groups require and warrant spe-
cial federal assistance in protecting their civil rights." Contra Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d
377, 385-86 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[N]othing in the legislative history suggests that Congress
was interested in protecting the federal judicial process only from those assaults moti-
vated by discriminatory animus.").
119 706 F.2d at 392.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1882) (criminal counter-
part to § 1985(3) declared unconstitutional); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951)
(§ 1985(3) requires action under color of state law).
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broad as their language. 122
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Court rejected its earlier construc-
tion that section 1985(3) reached only conspiracies under color of
state law, extending it to reach private conspiracies. 123 The Griffin
facts presented a compelling case for the extension of section
1985(3). The defendants' attack upon persons whom they mistak-
enly believed to be black civil rights workers was similar to the vio-
lent acts of the post-Civil War Ku Klux Klan. 124 Concerned about
extending section 1985(3) too far, however, the Court expressed its
reluctance to create a general federal tort law without explicit au-
thority from Congress. Consequently, the Court limited section
1985(3) to conspiracies motivated by class-based animus. 125
Worried that the Griffin Court's interpretation of section
1985(3) went beyond the intentions of the 1871 Congress and that it
might create a general federal tort law, the Supreme Court further
narrowed section 1985(3).126 In United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners v. Scott, 127 the Supreme Court limited the classes protected by
section 1985(3) in order to prevent the use of section 1985(3) in
economic or commercial contexts. 128 Economic or commercial con-
flicts, the Court stated, could be dealt with by specific federal or
state statutes or by the general law proscribing injuries to persons
and property. 129
The Griffin holding that section 1985(3) reached private con-
spiracies provided the impetus behind the current interpretation of
section 1985(2) clause one. Additionally, like section 1985(3), the
broad language of section 1985(2) could be interpreted to create a
federal tort law. The limitation in Griffin preventing section 1985(3)
from becoming a general federal tort law does not apply to section
1985(2) clause one. In Kush v. Rutledge, the Supreme Court held
that Congress did not intend to impose a requirement of class-based
animus on persons seeking to prove a violation of their rights under
section 1985(2) clause one.' 30 As such, the section 1985(3) limita-
122 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) ("The approach of this Court
to other Reconstruction civil rights statutes in the years since Collins has been to 'accord
[them] a sweep as a broad as [their] language.' ") (quoting United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 801 (1965)).
123 For an analysis of Griffin, see supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
126 The subsequent narrowing of § 1985(3), however, may not merely reflect at-
tempts to limit the parameters of the Griffin decision but may indicate a conservative shift
in the Court's attitude toward the civil rights statutes.
127 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983).
128 See supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
129 103 S. Ct. at 3361.
130 See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
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tions cannot be used to narrow the scope of section 1985(2) clause
one. Because the Court in Kush faced only the issue of whether the
class-based animus requirement of section 1985(3) applied and did
not otherwise interpret section 1985(2), the lower courts are still
faced with the task of narrowing the scope of the section.
IV
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN INTERPRETING SECTION 1985(2)
CLAUSE ONE
A. Federal Tort Law
Read broadly, section 1985(2) clause one proscribes any type of
retaliation against someone for having attended or testified in fed-
eral court. Such a broad reading, however, could significantly affect
contractual relations between private parties who often prefer to
enter into contracts terminable at will by the other party. If one
party were sued by the other, the party sued might try to terminate
the contract. A broad reading of section 1985(2) clause one would
view this termination as retaliation for attending federal court and,
thus, would create a new substantive right. A court should be wary
of creating such a right, however, because it could undermine signif-
icantly the value of contracts, particularly employment contracts.' 3 '
B. Legislative History
Notwithstanding the propriety of this new substantive right, the
legislative history does not support such a broad reading of section
1985(2) clause one. Section 1985(2) clause one was enacted as part
of the post-Civil War Ku Klux Klan Act. 132 The legislative history
fails to indicate that the 1871 Congress intended the act to address
social, commercial, or economic influences; the act was aimed solely
at protecting society from the Klan's violence.' 33
The Ku Klux Klan Act also addressed the proper degree of fed-
eral intervention in local affairs of the states.' 3 4 Many representa-
tives claimed that the original version of the act would usurp state
131 For example, an employer should be able to dismiss a disloyal employee. In
addition, future interaction between the employee and employer will be strained be-
cause it would be difficult for the employer to work with the employee without impairing
its ability to defend itself in an action brought by the employee. The personal relation-
ship between the employer and employee requires a substantial degree of mutual trust
to enhance an open exchange of information and ideas. A broad interpretation of
§ 1985(2) clause one prevents the employer from terminating its employee in accord-
ance with their contract.
132 See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
133 See supra note 10.
134 See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction over local concerns. 135 Other representatives felt that
Congress possessed no constitutional power to punish section
1985(3) private conspiracies. 136 These constitutional concerns did
not apply to section 1985(2) clause one. Nonetheless, the legislative
history shows Congress favored preserving state autonomy in local
affairs. 137 The extension of section 1985(2) clause one to reach pri-
vate conspiracies in social, economic or commercial contexts, espe-
cially when the conspiracies are not prohibited by state law, is
inconsistent with Congress's desire to limit intervention in the
states' local affairs. 138
C. Practical Considerations
Practical considerations also shape the scope of section 1985(2)
clause one. A broad construction would increase the workload of
the federal courts. First, many more suits would be filed under a
more broadly construed section 1985(2) clause one. If section
1985(2) clause one creates substantive federal rights, these rights
would be available only to parties suing in federal court, 139 thus cre-
ating an incentive to sue in federal court. Second, pendent state
claims would increase the federal court workload. 140 Although state
claims are more appropriately handled by state courts, 14 1 many
135 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
138 The Ku Klux Klan Act contained criminal provisions in addition to the private
cause of action that are not codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982). The criminal provisions
contain the same language as the private causes of action. It would be hard to attribute
to the 1871 Congress an intention to create criminal penalties for economic or social
pressures.
Recent legislation suggests a narrower reading by later Congresses. See Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1513 (1984)). In that Act, anyone who "causes bodily injury to another per-
son or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with
intent to retaliate against any person for ... any testimony given" commits a crime.
The legislation limits this retaliation to bodily injury and damages to tangible property,
see id., an equivalent standard to the one suggested by this Note for § 1985(2). Congress
also authorized a civil action to restrain harassment of a victim or witness, but did not
create a private cause of action for damages. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514 (1984).
139 Section 1985(2) clause 2 governs the judicial administration in state courts. This
section contains "equal protection of the laws" language, thereby requiring class-based
animus. See 19 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1982). Thus, plaintiffs who are not among an identifi-
able class must sue in federal court to obtain relief under § 1985(2).
140 Pendent jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear both a state claim for which no
independent federal jurisdiction exists and a recognized federal claim between the same
parties, provided that both claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact"
and are such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding." See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
141 State courts have greater expertise and familiarity with state law. Also, state sov-
ereiguty favors state courts handling state claims. As such, federal courts traditionally
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plaintiffs prefer to bring state claims in federal court.1 42
A broad -reading of section 1985(2) clause one may also allow
plaintiffs to circumvent other federal and state statutes. 143 A plain-
tiff could use section 1985(2) clause one to avoid the carefully de-
fined standards of a specific statute. Congress sometimes supplants
specific state law when there are countervailing federal interests. 144
When Congress does not expressly address a problem, a court
should not construe a general statute to destroy important state
statutory objectives. Similarly, when Congress has addressed a
problem, a court should not interfere with the specific statute's solu-
tion to the problem.145
V
PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS OF SECTION 1985(2) CLAUSE
ONE
Different approaches have been suggested to narrow section
1985(2) clause one. Any construction, however, must consider the
legislative history, practical considerations and purpose of the sec-
tion. Section 1985(2) clause one must preserve the integrity of the
federal judicial process without overburdening the federal courts
with cases reaching beyond the intention of the 1871 Congress.
A. The Kimble Approach
In Kimble, the court narrowed section 1985(2) by construing the
"attended or testified" language in section 1985(2) clause one nar-
rowly to require actual physical presence in the courtroom. 146 The
Kimble approach limits the scope of section 1985(2) clause one,
thereby reducing the workload of the federal courts. This approach,
however, does not comport with the legislative purpose behind sec-
tion 1985(2) clause one, 147 because it fails to protect an individual
have limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts over state claims. See generally C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 105-09 (1983).
142 Plaintiffs often find the federal rules of civil procedure more favorable in a partic-
ular cause than corresponding state rules.
143 See, e.g., Williams v. St.Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1980) (antitrust
laws, not § 1984, are more plausible basis for action against doctors that conspired to
refuse to treat persons instituting malpractice suit).
144 Congress often enacts statutes to achieve uniformity. In 1871, the states were
unwilling or unable to control the lawlessness of the Ku Klux Klan, a state of affairs
justifying federal legislation.
145 See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters andJoiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352, 3361
(1983) (rejecting plaintiffs' § 1985 claim stating that such "[e]conomic and commercial
conflicts [between union and nonunion workers] are best dealt with by statutes, federal
or state, specifically addressed to such problems, as well as by the general law proscrib-
ing injuries").
146 See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
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maimed for filing a suit in federal court. The approach also neglects
to address specifically whether section 1985(2) clause one applies to
social, commercial or economic influences.1 48 Although Kimble re-
quires actual physical presence in the courtroom, such presence
does not necessarily imply physical retaliation. Thus, the Kimble
construction of section 1985(2) clause one should be rejected be-
cause it does not protect the entire judicial process and possesses
many of the same shortcomings as a broad reading of the section.
B. The Novotny Independent Illegality Approach
One note, 49 while rejecting the narrow holding of Kimble,
would require the defendant's conduct to be independently ille-
gal.' 50 Under this approach, section 1985(2) clause one provides no
substantive rights. Rather, the section merely remedies violations of
other rights, privileges and immunities. Thus, on the facts of Kimble,
a section 1985(2) clause one claim arises only if state law prohibits
retaliation against an employee filing personal injury claims.' 5 '
The independent illegality requirement avoids many of the
problems of a broad reading of section 1985(2) clause one. By defi-
nition, the independent illegality construction will not create new
substantive rights. The construction thus preserves the policies in
other statutes because those statutes' standards must be met to re-
ceive relief. The construction will limit the scope of section 1985(2)
clause one "to those unambiguous interferences with access to fed-
eral courts that the subsection was designed to prevent."' 52
Although the independent illegality requirement limits the
scope of section 1985(2) clause one and thereby avoids the practical
problems of a broad reading of the section, the construction never-
theless should be rejected because it extends section 1985(2) clause
one beyond its intended reach. The 1871 Congress intended to
eradicate Klan violence and vigilantism in the post-Civil War
South. 53 There is nothing in the legislative history indicating that
148 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
149 Note, Nonviolent Retaliation, Federalism, and the Injury Requirement of § 1985(2), 69
VA. L. REV. 179 (1983).
150 Id. at 196-202. The student commentator suggests that the injury be legally cog-
nizable, i.e., actionable other than under a theory that § 1985(2) clause one creates sub-
stantive rights. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
151 See Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978) (Alabama law does not recog-
nize an implied right of an employee at will to continued employment after consulting
an attorney and applying for workman's compensation). But cf. Britt v. Suckle, 453 F.
Supp. 987, 993 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (under Texas law, employer may not retaliate against
employee who filed workers' compensation claim). See Note, supra note 149, at 199
n.103.
152 Note, supra note 149, at 198 (footnote omitted).
153 See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
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the 1871 Congress intended the section to be used in commercial or
economic contexts. 154 The independent illegality approach, how-
ever, will extend the section into any context in which state or fed-
eral law provides relief for retaliation, including commercial
contexts. For instance, a claim will arise under the section if state
law prohibits retaliation against an employee filing worker's com-
pensation claims. 155
Furthermore, there is no authority for applying the independ-
ent illegality requirement to section 1985(2) clause one.' 56 In
Novotny, the Supreme Court held that section 1985(3) requires the
independent illegality of the defendant's conduct. 157 The textual
basis for this requirement is the "equal protection of the laws" lan-
guage in section 1985(3).158 Section 1985(2) clause one does not
contain language requiring that the conspirators act with intent to
deprive their victims of the "equal protection of the laws." ' 59 More-
over, the "equal protection" language arose in response to constitu-
tional concerns inapplicable to section 1985(2) clause one. The
holding in Kush, that the class-based animus requirement of section
1985(3) does not apply to section 1985(2) clause one, 160 supports
the conclusion that the independent illegality requirement of sec-
tion 1985(3) does not apply to section 1985(2) clause one. Accord-
ingly, the independent illegality construction of section 1985(2)
clause one should be rejected.
C. Presence or Threat of Physical Force or Similarly
Malevolent Act Requirement
Judge Meskill's opinion in Keating offers the most promising ap-
proach to narrowing section 1985(2) clause one. 161 According to
that approach, section 1985(1) clause one requires physical force,
threats of violence, or similarly malevolent acts. 162 This require-
ment derives from language in the section requiring deterrence "by
force, intimidation or threat."' 63 The retaliation part of the clause
does not contain this language; however, the section read as a whole
154 See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
156 See Kimble v. DJ. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1069 (5th Cir. 1980) (independ-
ent illegality requirement not applicable to § 1985(2) clause 1), vacated, 648 F.2d 340
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981).
157 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
158 Great Am. Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 373 (1979).
159 See supra notes 24-32, 48, 78-82 and accompanying text.
160 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
161 Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 388 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, J., concurring and
dissenting).
162 See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 1, 112-20 and accompanying text.
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indicates that the same requirement should apply. Because the first
part prohibits the use of force or violence to deter a witness's partic-
ipation, it follows that the second part refers only to injury resulting
from force or violence in retaliation for such participation. For ex-
ample, recovery should be allowed under section 1985(2) clause one
if a defendant threatens to or actually does break a witness's leg. If
the defendant, however, threatens to or does trump up charges
against the plaintiff if he testifies, no recovery should be allowed. i64
The "presence or threat of physical force or similarly malevo-
lent act" requirement properly accommodates the legislative history
and purposes of section 1985(2) clause one. Section 1985(2) clause
one was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act to control the
group's violence. 165 Nothing in the legislative history indicates that
Congress's sole intent was to rectify Klan violence.1 66 The proposed
requirement allows recovery in situations contemplated by the 1871
Congress-a party or witness threatened by acts of violence for pur-
suing his rights in federal court. The proposed requirement, how-
ever, will not extend the use of section 1985(2) clause one into
unintended areas.
The proposed construction protects the integrity of the federal
judicial process. The construction provides a remedy for those who
are threatened by violence for using the judicial process. The lan-
guage of section 1985(2) clause one is ill-equipped to distinguish
between proper and improper social, commercial, or economic in-
fluences. Because Congress did not focus on these improper influ-
ences, there is no guidance for a court to draw the line. Congress
should address these concerns. Even if Congress fails to enact new
legislation, however, plaintiffs continue to enjoy access to all the
remedies available before the 1974 revitalization of section 1985(2)
clause one.
The proposed construction does not create a federal cause of
action for retaliation and maintains the right to terminate a contract
at will. 16 7 The proposed construction also avoids the problems
posed by a broad reading of section 1985(2) clause one. The con-
struction will reduce the federal workload by limiting the section's
availability to those cases in which violence impedes the federal judi-
cial process. The construction also reduces the number of state
claims that can be brought in federal court via pendent jurisdiction
by limiting the area of overlap between the section and state law.
The proposed construction thus prevents the overburdening of the
164 This is the fact pattern of Keating.
165 See supra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 138.
167 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
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federal courts with cases that reach beyond the intention of the 1871
Congress while it protects the integrity of the federal judicial
process.
CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court interpretations have narrowed the
scope of section 1985(3) to bring the section into harmony with the
intent of the 1871 Congress. The same considerations suggest a
similar narrowing of section 1985(2) clause one. The lower courts
have taken different approaches toward this issue. The best ap-
proach takes into account the legislative history, practical considera-
tions, and purposes of section 1985(2) and requires the presence or
threat of physical force or similarly malevolent acts.
Brian J. Gaj
